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I. War Crimes*
The year 2009 was an active one for prosecuting violations of the law of war. The trial
of former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadiic began before the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on October 26, 2009.1 Karadiic, representing
himself, at first boycotted his trial, protesting the amount of time he was given to pre-
pare.2 In response, the ICTY Trial Chamber requested that the Tribunal's Registrar as-
sign Karadiic counsel and postpone trial to give assigned counsel time to prepare.3
Karadiic is one of the three highest profile persons indicted by the court; along with
former Serbian President Slobodan Milolevic, who died during trial in 2006; and Bosnian
Serb military leader, Ratko Mladic, who is still at large. Karadiic is charged with crimes
against humanity, violations of the law of war and genocide, in part for his involvement in
the siege of Sarajevo from 1992-95 and for the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica
in 1995.4
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1. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case Information Sheet (IT-95-5/18)
(2009), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/cis/en/cis-karadzic-en.pdf.
2. Prosecutor v. Karadiic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Appointment of Counsel and Order on
Further Trial Proceedings, $ 1-4 (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tdec/en/
091105.pdf.
3. Case Information Sheet (IT-95-5/18), supra note 1.
4. Prosecutor v. Karadiic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Third Amended Indictment, (Feb. 27, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/ind/en/090227.pdf.
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The ICTY is currently scheduled to complete its last appeal in 2013.s The Tribunal
indicted 161 individuals; completed proceedings for 120 of those indicted, and has 39
cases ongoing.6 In addition to Ratko Mladic, Goran Hadiid, the political leader of the
Serb entity in Croatia during the mid-1990s, is also at large.7
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) continued hearing cases in
2009. It has thirty-nine cases currently in progress, ten of which are appeals.8 ICTR has
indicted ninety people thus far, and has completed forty-nine cases.9
The Special Court for Sierra Leone Appeals Chamber issued its judgment in the Revo-
lutionary United Front (RUF) trial, in which three defendants were convicted.' 0 The
Appeals Chamber upheld the convictions of RUF Interim Leader, Issa Hassan Sesay, and
Senior RUF Commander, Morris Kallon on all counts." The Court overturned two
counts against former RUF Security Chief, Augustine Gbao, but upheld the remaining
counts,12 Significantly, the Appeals Chamber Judgment upheld the first convictions by an
international tribunal for forced marriage as a crime against humanity and for attacks
against United Nations peacekeepers as a crime against humanity.'3 The trial of the high-
est-profile defendant, former President of Liberia Charles Taylor continued, with the trial
moving from the prosecution phase to the defense phase. Taylor has been indicted on
eleven counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious crimes.'4
The Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) has opened and is con-
ducting investigations into four situations. All except one, Sudan, were self-referred. In
the first situation, the Democratic Republic of Congo, four arrest warrants have been
issued.' 5 Three persons have been surrendered to the Court.' 6 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is
charged with use of child soldiers.' 7 His trial commenced in January 2009. Germain
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui were jointly charged with crimes against humanity
including murder, rape, and sexual slavery; and war crimes including conscription of child
soldiers, destruction of property, pillaging, and directing attacks against the civilian popu-
5. See generally United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, About the
ICTY, http://www.icty.org/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See generally United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Latest News, http://
www.ictr.org/default.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
9. Id.
10. See The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case 15: The Prosecutor vs. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF
Case), http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsSesayKallonandGbaoRUFCase/tabid/105/Default.aspx (last
visited Jan. 31, 2010).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case 16: The Prosecutor vs. Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC
Case), http://www.se-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRCCase/tabid/106/Default.aspx
(last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
14. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment, (May 29,
2007), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=rnObAAMvYM%3d&tabid=107.
15. UN Gen. Assembly, Report of the International Criminal Court, summary, U.N. Doc. A/64/356 (Sept.
17, 2009) [hereinafter ICC Report].
16. Id.
17. Id. at 6.
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lation.18 Their trial was scheduled to start November 24, 2009. Bosco Ntaganda remains
at large.
In the second situation, Uganda, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued five arrest warrants, one
against Joseph Kony, commander of the Lord's Resistance Army. 19 All of the accused are
still at large.
The third situation is Sudan, which was referred by the United Nations Security Coun-
cil.20 Arrest warrants have been issued against three persons, all of whom are still at large,
including Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, President of Sudan. 21 Charges include murder,
extermination, forcible transfer, torture, rape, intentionally directing attacks against civil-
ians, and pillaging.22 A summons to appear was issued against Bahr Idriss Abu Garda. 23
He appeared before the Pre-Trial Chamber and is charged with three counts of war
crimes related to an attack on the African Union Mission in Sudan. 24
In the fourth situation, the Central African Republic, one arrest warrant has been issued
by the Pre-Trial Chamber for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. 25 He is charged with crimes
against humanity and war crimes, including pillage and rape. 26
In Cambodia, five persons are being prosecuted before the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia for atrocities committed during the Khmer Rouge regime. 27 The
first trial, of Kaing Guek Eav (Duch), began on February 17, 2009.28 He was the Secre-
tary of S-21, a security center where 15,000 prisoners died. 29 He is charged with crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and violations of Cambodian law including murder and
torture.30 The trials of the other four defendants are in the pre-trial stage.
Although not a prosecution, it is worth noting that the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Com-
mission, established pursuant to a December 2000 peace agreement between the two
countries, issued its final award for damages on August 17, 2009.31 The Commission's
mandate was to utilize binding arbitration to decide claims for damages resulting from law
of war violations during the 1998-2000 conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in two cir-
cumstances: claims by each government against the other and by nationals of one party
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/icedocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.
22. ICC Report, supra note 15, at 8.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id.
27. See generally Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Introduction to the ECCC, http://
www.eccc.gov.kh/english/about eccc.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
28. ECCC, CASE INFORMATION SHEET CASE FILE N" 001/18-07-2007/ECCC-TC (2009), available at
http://www.eccc.gov.khlenglish/cabinet/files/Case InfoDUCHEN.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Kaing Guek Eav "Duch," Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Closing Order indicting Kaing
Guek Eav alias Duch, IT 131-52 (Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/
courtDoc/1 15/Closing-order.indicting-KaingGuek Eav_- ENG.pdf.
31. Press Release, Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission, Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission Renders Fi-
nal Awards on Damages (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/EECC%20
Final%20Awards%2OPress%20Release.pdf
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against the government of the other party. 32 The commission awarded $174 million to
Ethiopia for Eritrea'sjus in bello and bellum jus ad violations and $161.5 million to Eritrea
for Ethiopia's violations ofjus in bello.33
I. Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister): The Consequences of State
Participation in Torture*
Thomas Wolfe notwithstanding, perhaps you can go home again. Such was the glim-
mer of hope offered by Justices Evans and Sharlow of the Canadian Federal Court of
Appeal to Guantinamo Bay Detention Camp detainee Omar Ahmed Khadr. 34 In order-
ing the Government of Canada to seek Mr. Khadr's repatriation, the Court explored the
limits of judicial superintendence over ministerial discretion, and offered useful insights
into the extraterritorial application of Canadian constitutional law.
Omar Khadr was born in Canada to Egyptian-Canadian parents with ties to Al-Qaeda.
He was fifteen years old when he was captured by U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan and
was held in custody under the belief that he had thrown a grenade that caused the death of
a U.S. soldier. After three months at Bagram Airbase, Mr. Khadr was moved to
Guantinamo. 35
Omar Khadr's plight has captured the attention of the legal community in Canada and
internationally, partly because the Canadian government has not sought his repatriation,
but mostly because he was a child when arrested.
Mr. Khadr was processed initially as an enemy combatant under the provisions of the
Presidential Military Order of November 13, 2001.36 After the procedural regime estab-
lished under that order was declared illegal by the United States Supreme Court,3 7 Mr.
Khadr was prosecuted under the Military Commissions Act of 2006.38 He faces an array
of charges in Guantinamo, including murder and attempted murder in violation of the
law of war, conspiracy, providing material support for terrorism, and spying.39
Mr. Khadr has sought help from Canadian courts several times. In 2005, Justice von
Finckenstein of the Federal Court issued an injunction preventing Canadian authorities
from conducting any more interrogations of Mr. Khadr.40 In 2006, Mr. Khadr obtained
an order from the Federal Court of Appeal compelling the Minister of Justice to turn over
32. Id.
33. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission has Delivered its Final Award Ordering Compensation to Both Sides
of the 1998-2000 War, HAGUE JUSTICE PoRTAL, Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/
DEF/l0/951.TGFuZzlFTg.html.
* This section was authored by Del William Atwood. He is a judge of the Nova Scotia Provincial Court
and Family Court.
34. Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), 12009] F.C.J. 893, 2009 FCA 246 (Nadon JA. dissenting); affg,
[2009] F.CJ. 462, 2009 FC 405 (Can.).
35. Affidavit of Lt. Cdr. William at i 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, Khadr, [2009] F.CJ. 893 (found in Court of Appeal
Book, Vol. I).
36. See Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
37. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 558-60 (2006).
38. Military Commission Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2625 (2006).
39. Affidavit of Lt. Cdr. Kuebler at 1 45, Exhibit K, Khadr, [2009] F.CJ. 893.
40. Khadr v. Canada (F.C.), [20061 2 F.C.R. 505 (Can.).
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documents held by the federal government that would assist his Guantinamo defense.4i
Neither of those decisions, however, offered the prospect of returning to Canada. The
appellate review conducted by the Federal Court of Appeal in the summer of 2009 pro-
vided that very relief.
Although Mr. Khadr claims to have been subjected to an array of coercive interrogation
techniques at Guantinamo, only sleep deprivation was formally found by the Court of
Appeal to have taken place. 42 But, that was enough.
The majority of the Court found that the use of sleep deprivation against Mr. Khadr
violated the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment.43 Accordingly, Mr. Khadr was found to have been tortured. The
holding implicated Canada in this violation, as agents of the Canadian Security and Intel-
ligence Service interrogated Mr. Khadr at Guantinamo for law-enforcement and intelli-
gence-gathering purposes. Indeed, the agents had turned over to U.S. authorities
information gleaned from these sessions-knowing of the illegal conditions of Mr.
Khadr's confinement.44
Given the finding that Canadian authorities were participants in a process that violated
international law, the majority concluded that Canadian official conduct was subject to the
extraterritorial application in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
which constitutionalizes the duty of the state to protect the life, liberty, and security of
persons under its protection.45
The question then left for the court was whether this duty to protect would overcome
the exercise of ministerial prerogative and discretion not to seek Mr. Khadr's repatriation.
As the majority posed it, what obligations does Canada owe its citizens abroad in circum-
stances when their rights under the Charter are engaged?4 6
In resolving this issue, the majority found that, because Mr. Khadr was a child when
captured, Canada was required under conventional law to protect him from violence, in-
jury, and abuse. 47 The government of Canada was obligated to mitigate the deprivation of
rights protected by constitutional and conventional law-a deprivation in which it was
found to have participated. This would be achieved most appropriately by ordering the
prime minister and other senior officials to make the request that the United States return
Mr. Khadr to Canada.48
The majority was not persuaded by the argument that an order compelling a repatria-
tion request would involve the court in the exercise of a prerogative power involving rela-
41. Khadr v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [20081 1 F.C.R. 270 (Can.).
42. Khadr, [20091 F.C.J. 893, T1 20, 35.
43. Id. '152 (citing Canada, Aug. 23, 1985, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, Can. T.S. 1987 No. 36, entered into force
June 26, 1987).
44. Id. 55.
45. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, no.
7.
46. Khadr, [2009] F.C.J. 893, $1 55-57.
47. Id. 153 (citing the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Canada, May 28, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3,
Can. T.S. 1992, No. 3, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990, art. 37(a)); see also Optional Protocol to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex
I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000).
48. Khadr, [2009] F.C.J. 893, 70.
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tions with the States. Such an order required no special knowledge that might not be
possessed by the Court, and would not require ongoing judicial supervision. 49
On September 4, 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada granted the federal government
leave to appeal.50 Argument was heard on November 13, 2009. Curiously absent from
the government's case has been any meaningful analysis of alternative remedies based on
President Obama's executive order bringing military commissions up to U.S. and interna-
tional-law due process standards.51 Would a request for due process in a civilian court be
a suitable substitute for repatriation?
A late-breaking development is the announcement made by Attorney General Eric
Holder-released just as the Supreme Court of Canada was hearing argument in Ot-
tawa-that Omar Khadr was one of ten high-value Guantinamo detainees whose prosecu-
tions would be continued by the United States, in Mr. Khadr's case, before a military
commission. 52 In recognizing that Mr. Khadr is not in the same class as Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, Walid Muhammed Salih Mubarak Bin Attash, Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, Ali Ab-
dul-Aziz Ali, or Mustafa Ahmed Al Hawsawi; the attorney general may be signaling that
alternatives to prosecution are on the table.
Il1. CFIUS Review: What Foreign Acquisitions Pose National Security
Concerns?*
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS or the Commit-
tee) reviews mergers and acquisitions to identify and address any national security risks.53
CFIUS has jurisdiction to review any deal in which a foreign person will obtain control of
a U.S. business-a "covered transaction." In November 2008, the CFIUS regulations
were overhauled to implement changes required by the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act (FINSA).54 CFIUS jurisdiction and review processes are now more clear.
One remaining puzzle is determining whether to submit a particular deal for CFIUS
review. The decision turns on whether CFIUS is likely to identify any national security
considerations. CFIUS review is voluntary (though the Committee can self-initiate a re-
view), and the parties must decide whether to file a voluntary notice. Most do not file:
"historically fewer than ten percent of all foreign acquisitions of U.S. businesses are noti-
49. Id. [ 72.
50. Appeal in Khadr Case to be Heard by Top Court, CBC NEWS, Sept. 4, 2009, http://www.cbc.calcanadal
story/2009/09/04/khadr-supreme-court904O9.html.
51. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 27, 2009); see also National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-1807, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009).
52. Press Conference, Eric Holder, United States Attorney General (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://
blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/348.
* Adrianne Goins is a senior associate with Vinson & Elkins LLP. She thanks Michael Howes, a student
at the University of Virginia School of Law, for his research assistance.
53. Members are the Secretaries of the Treasury, Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, State, Energy,
and Labor (non-voting); the Attorney General; the Director of National Intelligence (non-voting); and the
heads of those other departments and agencies the President deems appropriate. See 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 2170(k)(2) (2007).
54. FINSA amended § 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (2007). The
regulations are found at 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.101-801 (2008). For an overview of the changes, see Department of
Treasury, Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 73 Fed. Reg.
70,702-70,716 (Nov. 21, 2008).
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fled to CFIUS."ss One reason to file is to gain the assurance that the Government will
not unwind the transaction later. Neither CFIUS nor the President will exercise divest-
ment authority for deals that have been approved.5 6 The Committee's high approval rate
is another incentive to file. "Between 2005 and 2007, 313 voluntary notices of covered
transactions were filed with CFTUS, and none of the transactions were prohibited."5 7
But what if a deal does not appear to implicate any national security considerations?
Should precious resources be spent on a discretionary filing?5 Based on a review of
CFIUS guidance and reported data, as well as publicly available information on filings,
this article describes the types of U.S. businesses involved in transactions reviewed by
CFIUS.s9
CFIUS also closely considers the nature of the foreign acquirer. 60 Specifically, CFIUS
considers whether the acquirer is foreign-government controlled or whether the ac-
quirer's country supports terrorism, is involved in proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, or is a potential regional military threat.61 Parties should analyze both aspects
of any covered transaction when deciding whether to notify CFIUS voluntarily.
The parties must determine whether a covered transaction presents any national secur-
ity considerations. This determination is not straightforward, as the term "national secur-
ity" is not defined in the statute or regulations. The statute provides a list of factors that
CFIUS may consider, but the Committee's review expands concomitantly with the con-
cept of national security. In addition to the listed factors, CFIUS considers "all other
national security factors that are relevant to a covered transaction it is reviewing." 62
Traditional Defense Grouping: Not surprisingly, a "significant number" of deals reviewed
by CFIUS have involved foreign acquisitions of U.S. businesses that provide defense-re-
lated products and services to the U.S. government. 63 This traditional defense grouping
includes companies with access to classified information, businesses related to law enforce-
ment, and cyber-security. This defense grouping also includes businesses in certain criti-
cal technology sectors. FINSA defines "critical technologies" as "critical technology,
critical components, or critical technology items essential to national defense."64 The
critical sectors are advanced materials and processing, chemicals, advanced manufacturing,
information technology, telecommunications, microelectronics, semiconductor
fabrication equipment, military-related electronics, biotechnology, professional and scien-
tific instruments, aerospace and surface transportation, energy, and space and marine sys-
55. 73 Fed. Reg. at 70,716.
56. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.601.
57. CoMMIrrTE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
(2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/intemational-affairs/cflus/docs/CFIUS-Annual-Rpt-2008.
pdf, {hereinafter CFIUS Annual Report]. Some notices were withdrawn by the parties.
58. CFIUS review can take up to ninety days. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.501-506.
59. CFIUS review is confidential, but the Committee has published aggregate data and guidance. Some
companies publicize information on CFIUS reviews in press releases and SEC filings.
60. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by the Committee on Foreign Invest-
ment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,567, 74,570 (Dec. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Guidance].
61. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(0(4), (8), (9) (2007).
62. Guidance, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,569.
63. Id. at 74,570.
64. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(7).
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tems.6 5 These high-tech businesses are often involved in developing components with
both military and commercial applications, known as "dual-use" components.
Energy: In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the concept of
national security expanded beyond traditional defense concerns. The March 2005 attempt
by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to buy Unocal was another
formative event. Though CNOOC abandoned its bid, many lawmakers argued that
CFIUS should have blocked the proposed deal and that the Department of Energy should
have played a formal role. Two years later, FINSA made the Secretary of Energy a mem-
ber of CFIUS and expanded the list of factors to be considered. 66 CFIUS must now
consider the effects of a deal on "critical infrastructure, including major energy assets." 67
Guidance published by CFIUS confirms that it has reviewed deals involving foreign
acquisition of U.S. businesses in the energy sector. Energy companies drawing attention
from CFIUS include businesses "at various stages of the value chain." 68 The Committee
has reviewed acquisitions of oil and gas exploration and production companies as well as
pipeline transportation companies. Fifteen notices of transactions involving electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution were reviewed between 2005 and 2007.69
In one such transaction, an Australian-controlled entity purchased several power genera-
tion projects from Consolidated Edison. More recently, CFIUS reviewed Electricite de
France's acquisition of a stake in Constellation Energy.
Transportation: CFUIS has also reviewed foreign acquisitions of "businesses that affect
the nation's transportation system."70 Port operations and aviation maintenance are
among the types of businesses in this group. The Dubai Ports World transaction of 2006
is a prominent example. The company, owned by the United Arab Emirates, acquired an
English company with leases to operate several American ports. CFIUS approved the
transaction, but the ensuing political uproar led Dubai Ports World to sell the English
company's U.S. port operations.
Technical and Financial Services: CFIUS reports that more than one third of the deals
submitted for review between 2005 and 2007 were in the "information sector."7' This
sector overlaps with the traditional defense sector, as it includes telecommunications com-
panies. It also includes businesses offering professional, scientific, and technical services,
such as engineering, computer systems design, scientific research, and consulting.72 Fi-
nally, this category includes financial companies.73 In its December 2008 guidance,
65. CFIUS Annual Report, supra note 57, at 27. Some of the business categories are overlapping. While
both energy and transportation are listed as critical sectors, those types of businesses are also considered
separate groupings when the connection to national defense is less direct.
66. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k)(2)(G).
67. Id. § 2170(f)(6). The term "critical infrastructure" is defined as "systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets would have a
debilitating impact on national security." Id. § 2170(a)(6).
68. Guidance, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,570.
69. CFlUS Annual Report, supra note 57, at 8-9.
70. Guidance, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,570.
71. CFIUS Annual Report, supra note 57, at 6-7.
72. Id. at 8.
73. Id. at 7.
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CFIUS confirmed that it has reviewed transactions involving "businesses that could signif-
icantly and directly affect the U.S. financial system."74
The expanding concept of national security, as reflected in FINSA, and the revised
regulations and guidance effectively obligates parties to scrutinize foreign acquisitions of
U.S. businesses outside the traditional defense sector. As has historically been true, par-
ties should voluntarily notify CFIUS of deals in that sector. CFIUS review has now ex-
panded to consider potential risks to U.S. energy and transportation infrastructures. The
national security considerations involved in acquisitions of technical consulting and finan-
cial companies are less obvious, but nevertheless should also be analyzed. Finally, as noted
above, parties should also consider the nature of the foreign acquirer when determining
whether to voluntarily notify CFIUS of a proposed transaction.
IV. Detainee Photographs: United States Department of Defense v.
American Civil Liberties Union, and the Protected National Security
Documents Act of 2009.*
On October 29, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act of 2010, which contains a provision potentially mooting a six-
year controversy between the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the United
States Department of Defense (DoD) over the release of suspected detainee abuse
photographs.75
The controversy began with the October 7, 2003 filing of a request for expedited re-
lease of DoD records related to allegations of detainee abuse in Afghanistan pursuant to
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)76 by the ACLU and several other interested par-
ties.77 After receiving subsequent DoD responses that ACLU requests did not meet crite-
ria for expedited release, 78 the ACLU filed for injunctive relief in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York to compel release in 2004.79
During the course of the litigation, it was determined that the DoD was withholding
photographs depicting alleged detainee abuses in Afghanistan due to concerns about the
risk to U.S. forces under the FOIA exemption for "records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes [.. .] to the extent that the production of such law enforcement
records or information [. . .] could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical
74. Guidance, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,570.
* This section was authored by Gabriel C. Lajeunesse, a Visiting Associate at Georgetown University's
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.
75. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 565, 123 Stat.
2142 (2009).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009).
77. Letter from ACLU et al., to Freedom of Information Officer (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://
www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/nnACLUFOIArequest.pdf.
78. Letter from HJ. McIntyre, Director, U.S. Dept. of Defense, to Ms. Amrit Singh, ACLU Staff Attomey
(Oct. 30, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/mmDODrejectexpproc.pdf;
Letter from C.Y. Talbot, Chief, U.S. Dept. of Defense, to Ms. Jennifer Ching, Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan,
Griffinger & Vecchione (une 21, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoialegaldocuments/
iiDODDenyExpProc.pdf.
79. See Amended Complaint, ACLU v. Dep't ofDef, No. 04-CV-4151 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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safety of any individual."80 The U.S. government's position was that the photos, gathered
during the course of a criminal investigation by the Army Criminal Investigations Divi-
sion, were exempted law enforcements records whose release would incite violence against
U.S. soldiers.81 In its decision on September 22, 2008, the Second Circuit held in ACLU
v. Department of Defense that the 7(F) exemption was not applicable as the DoD could not
identify a single specific individual who might be endangered by the release. 82 On March
11, 2009, a DoD petition for a panel rehearing or hearing en banc was denied by the
Second Circuit.83
On August 7, 2009, the U.S. Solicitor General filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
with the Supreme Court on behalf of the DoD, appealing the Second Circuit's ruling.
The DoD argued that the FIOA exemption (U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F)) did exempt photo-
graphs concerning allegations of abuse of detainees when the disclosure of those photo-
graphs "could reasonably be expected to endanger the lives or physical safety of United
States military and civilian personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan." 84 The DoD argued that
the Second Circuit's interpretation of the 7(F) language "any individual" to mean a spe-
cific individual was in error, was contradictory to the expansive plain reading of the text,
and resulted in the rejection of numerous expert affidavits indicating that lives of DoD
personnel would be at risk should the photos be released.85 The ACLU, in response,
argued that the plain reading of the text required showing of a threat to a specific individ-
ual-otherwise the scope of the exemption would be overly broad and the statutory words
"any individual" would be superfluous and devoid of meaning. 86
Despite these arguments, the tensions between the competing interests of government
transparency and accountability versus the safety and security of U.S. military personnel
appear to have been settled by Congress. The Department of Homeland Security Appro-
priations Act, 2010, signed into law on October 29, 2009, contains within Section 565,
"The Protected National Security Documents Act of 2009," providing the Secretary of
Defense with FOIA exemption authority over these photographs upon a determination
that disclosure "would endanger citizens of the United States, members of the United
States Armed Forces, or employees of the United States Government deployed outside
the United States." 87 This exemption authority applies only to photographs taken of de-
tainees of U.S. military forces from September 11, 2001 to January 22, 2009, and requires
a recertification by the Secretary of Defense every three years.88
As of early November 2009, the Secretary of Defense had not yet exercised this new
exemption authority, and the Supreme Court was still conferencing with the parties re-
garding the impact of the legislation. The controversy has been widely regarded as legally
moot. Regardless of the legal standing, debates amongst advocates of human rights and
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (emphasis added).
81. ACLU v. Dep't of Defense, 543 F.3d 59, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 81.
83. Order, ACLU v. Dep't of Defense, No. 06-3140-cv (2d Cir. 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/
torturefoiallegaldocuments/OrderO3O9O9.pdf.
84. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dep't of Defense v. ACLU, No. 09-160 (S. Ct. Aug 7, 2009).
85. Id. at 15-16.
86. Brief in Opposition at 9-10, Dep't of Defense v. ACLU, No. 09-160 (S. Ct. Sept. 8, 2009).
87. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act § 565 (2010).
88. Id.
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civil liberties about the wisdom and morality of the law and use of the waiver authority
continue unabated.
V. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act of 2009*
With the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards (CFATS) for critical infrastructure facilities set to expire, Congress looks to
permanently authorize and/or expand the mandates. 9 The precise form of permanent
authorization is a hotly debated subject before the U.S. House of Representatives Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce. The current program is authorized under Section 550
of the DHS Appropriations Act of 2007.90 The debate turns on whether to amend Sec-
tion 550 drastically to encompass more facilities, allow civil suits, and create more control
in DHS to mandate changes in the facilities technologies.
The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009, H.R. 2868, incorporates the new
amendments.91 Under Section 550, there is a list of exempt entities regulated by other
statutes.92 H.R. 2868 requires that chemical facilities currently operating under the Mari-
time Transportation Security Act (MTSA)93 submit information to determine whether
they are a covered facility under CFATS. Covered facilities must update their vulnerabil-
ity assessments (VA) and site security plans (SSP) to comply with CFATS.94 H.R. 2868
would continue to exclude facilities owned by the Department of Defense,95 facilities reg-
ulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 96 and public water systems subject to the
Safe Drinking Water Act.97
A key issue included in H.R. 2868 is the Citizen Enforcement and Citizen Petitions
sections.98 The legislation would allow any person to commence a civil suit against any
government entity for failure to perform any nondiscretionary duty.99 The petition sec-
tion allows any person to file a petition with the Secretary of DHS identifying anyone in
violation of CFATS.00 House members and professionals in the private chemical sector
dispute the notion that citizen suits are commonplace in federal regulatory statutes.10
Two main concerns are that "civil suits generally have no place in national security legisla-
88. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-terrorism Standards (Nov. 19, 2009), http://
www.dhs.gov/files/laws/gcl 166796969417.shtm.
89. Id.
* This section was authored by John T. Hicks, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Terrorism Law, St.
Mary's University School of Law.
91. H.R. Rep. No. 111-205, pt. 2 (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?db
name= 11lcong-reports&docid=f:hr205p2.1 I .pdf
92. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat 1355
(2006).
93. 46 U.S.C. § 70103(c) (2009).
94. H.R. 2868, § 2103(f)(1).
95. Id. § 2112(1).
96. Id. §2112(3)(A).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 300f (1996).
98. H.R. 2868 §2116-17.
99. Id. § 2116(a)(1) (emphasis added).
100. Id. § 2117(b) (emphasis added).
101. See H.R. 2686, at 88. See also The Chemical Facility Antiterrorirm Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 2868
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, I 1lth Cong. 12
(2009) (statement of Stephen Poorman, Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates).
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tion"IO2 and that a suit would allow "a plaintiff, through the court system, to gain access to
information that [§2116 of H.R. 2868] is otherwise trying to protect." 03
CFATS currently lacks authorization to require facilities to use inherently safer technol-
ogies (ISTs) to reduce their risk or vulnerabilities, although the facilities may use such
technologies to satisfy their regulatory burdens.10 H.R. 2868 will grant the Director of
the Office of Chemical Facility Security the ability, "at his or her discretion," to force Tier
1 and 2 facilities to implement IST if it would significantly reduce risk and could be
implemented feasibly.os If the amendment becomes law, every facility covered under
CFATS must assess how to implement IST at its facility, including completion of a feasi-
bility study for the IST implementation. 0 6 DHS is in favor of having the regulatory
power to require IST implementation.10 7 Chemical industry experts are concerned that
"IST is a process-related engineering concept, not a security one." 08 Because there is no
"agreed-upon methodology to measure whether one process is inherently safer than an-
other,"l 09 a switch to an IST may not reduce overall risk, but simply shift it, making a
"safer" alternative more harmful than beneficial." 0 Opposing parties are concerned that
the amendments are not designed to bolster security and that DHS lacks the personnel to
properly evaluate IST."n
There are two distinct viewpoints about CFATS: .extend current legislation without
major changes to give the system a chance to work;"l 2 or overhaul the current CFATS
authorization to go further in securing our nation's chemical facilities." 3
102. H.R. Rep. No. 111-205, at 91 (dissenting views).
103. Id.
104. See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards; Final Rule, 6 C.F.R. pt. 27, 17718 (2007).
105. See H.R. 2868 § 2111(b)(1)(A), 2114.
106. Id. § 2111(a)(1).
107. See Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 2868 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
the Environment of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Illth Cong. (2009) (statement of Rand Beers,
Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Dep't of Homeland Security), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_1 11/20091001/beers-testimony.pdf.
108. See Poonnan, supra note 101, at 4.
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id. at 7-8.
111. See H.R. 2868.
112. See Beers, supra note 107.
113. See Legislative Hearing on H.R. 3258, the Drinking Water System Security Act of 2009, and H.R. 2868, the
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrvrum Act of 2009 Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2009)
(statement of Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Commerce).
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